

Plenary session A04-1

What is new in LBB concept and its application ? Industry and regulatory perspective

EPR-FA3 : From LBB to Break Exclusion

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Content



- introduction
- "break exclusion" and safety analysis
- practical application for EPR-Fa3
- 3rd level of defense in depth
- final consequences for EPR-Fa3



Introduction (1/2)



- **LBB is not really used on French PWRs, except for :**
 - ✓ Steam Generator Tubes
 - ✓ ISI defect evaluation and defense in depth in some limited cases

- **HELB :**
 - ✓ postulated DEGB in conventional location for primary systems : MCL
 - ✓ Postulated DEGB in Steam and Feed water systems
excepted for the part outside the containment – up to the main anchor point
US-RG application of "superpipe" concept
 - ✓ ANSI-ANS 58-2 (1988) for class 2 and 3 piping

- **Justification through NUREG 1061 requirements has been achieved in different pilot studies**
 - ✓ the "limiting" locations on French operating plants: duplex SS cast elbows, SS DMW, mixing tee thermal fatigue, stratification in feedwater system

- **Methods for justification are available in French Codes :**
 - ✓ RCC-MR Appendix A16 (G03-3) usable for PWRs
 - ✓ RCCM-RSEM for surface flaw analysis



Introduction (2/2)



- EPR-Fa3 considers that some piping systems have to be considered as "unbreakable" in different conditions for safety reasons and corresponding consequences in term of margins and operation
- In this case :
 - ✓ Defense in depth principles are reviewed for corresponding piping systems
 - ✓ Consequences on the other systems and structures is also defined
 - ✓ A specific methodology for justification is developed between Utility (EDF) and Vendor (AREVA)
 - ✓ Rules and data are collected and specific actions are taken
 - ✓ Presentation to Safety Authority
- Break Exclusion : Not only a piping integrity question but safety consequences are studied



"break exclusion" and safety analysis



➤ Defense in depth principle applied to piping systems :

✓1 : no degradation, no break of HE piping systems for all design transients : design, fabrication, NDE, hydrostatic test, overpressure protection

✓2 : surveillance and agreement with previous predictions

✓3 : HELB consequences : core cooling and containment

✓4 : Severe accident sequences

➤ Consequences of "break exclusion"



➤ Consequently

➤ simple design, limited length, limited number of welds, forged nozzles, HQ material and welding, strong NDE criteria for defects and thickness

➤ Many surveillance programs : transient monitoring, chemistry, displacement, material properties


➤ No break in design basis transients : replaced by larger connected pipe that does not fulfill BE criteria

➤ Flaw tolerance to large through wall cracks inside containment

➤ DEGB analysis with realistic data

➤ No major changes

Differences between BE and LBB





- Applied to MCL and MSL (inside & outside containment)
- Consequently, MCL and MSL will be RCCM class 1⁺
 - ✓⁺ : more stringent criteria compatible with SOA level
 - For design, fabrication, material (and material properties) and NDE
 - ✓ MCL in SS with narrow gap DMW,
 - ✓ MSL in CS
- Normal design requirements for all class 1 components
 - ✓ Sizing of pipes and supports for static and dynamic loads
 - ✓ No active "significant" degradation for 60 years (no cracks, no thinning, no thermal mixing areas)
 - ✓ "Large" flaw tolerance : $\frac{1}{4}$ t with SF of 2 – 1.6 – 1.2 for level A-C-D with EOL material properties
 - ✓ + any crack growth mechanism (fatigue and-or corrosion) has to be evaluated for 60Y on a conventional 5x20mm initial crack



➤ Material mechanical properties

- ✓ Codified values if available
- ✓ Through "direct" measurements on material if not available in the Code
- ✓ Thermal ageing for 60Y of operation has to be considered

➤ Fabrication : forged tee, large bend radius, SL anchor point...

➤ NDE :

- ✓ 100% with high performance (without formal performance demonstration) for defects; with 2 independent techniques for DMW
- ✓ All the **thickness** of components and counter-bore will be checked in accordance with design standards

➤ Surveillance :

- ✓ transient monitoring, displacement, temperature, chemistry...
- ✓ ISI for all welds with a justified performance and frequency
- ✓ All the **predictions of potential degradations have to be review and updated** maximum every 10Y (in connection with PSR)



3rd level of defense in depth : safety analysis



- **For piping inside the containment, a critical rectangular TWC has to be evaluated and sufficiently large :**
 - ✓ Corresponding leak has to be detectable by LDS with SF in normal op.
 - ✓ Basic SF of 2 on crack size and 10 on LFR are presently base values

- **For piping outside containment**
 - ✓ Corresponding length has to be "larger" the the max length of the EOL critical surface crack
 - ✓ No specific LDS added

- **DEGB has to be analyzed with realistic data for safety analysis**



Final consequences for EPR-FA3



- No LBLOCA or SLB in the design transient list for all the mechanical component design stress report and core analysis
- Replaced by the larger diameter connected line (in position)
- No pipe whip restraints
- 2A equivalent static load is considered for all class 1 component supports
- 2A is used for ECCS cooling systems, containment and component qualification to accidental conditions